The partial remedies introduced by the EU Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market of 14 September 2016

InfoSoc’s unbalanced approach has been only partially – very partially – remedied by the Proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market of 14 September 2016 (here). Let us go through its main tenets.

  1. New mandatory exceptions

The Proposal envisages the extension of the range of mandatory exceptions to:

  1. “reproductions and extractions made by research organizations in order to carry out text and data mining…for the purpose of scientific research” (Art. 3);
  2. “the digital use of works…for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching, to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose…” (Art. 4, dictating further restrictive conditions for the enjoyment of the exception; emphasis added);
  3. making copies, by cultural heritage institutions, of works permanently in their collections, for the sole purpose of preservation of such works (Art. 5).

These extensions deserve approval, of course, as they ‘upgrade’ to mandatory exceptions that InfoSoc provides as discretionary (Art. 5,2.c, e, and 3,a). But their impact is weakened by their persistent subjection – as all other exceptions and limitations foreseen by InfoSoc – to the barrier of the (in)famous three-step test which allows the copyright holder to oppose in judiciary sitting the actual enjoyment of the exceptions. Moreover, they are equally subject to the criterion of ‘strict interpretation’, also dictated by InfoSoc (confirmed by Art. 6 of the Proposal). Thus, for example, the ‘new’ exceptions under a), b) and c) would not allow either the market exploitation by research organizations of the fruits (reports) of their work, or the chance of Universities and other teaching institutions to edit and publish texts assembling lessons and other fruits of their educational activities.

Now, in all the cases where the public interest to spread culture and information may marry with economic exploitation (at times, however, non lucrative in proper sense: cultural heritage institutions, for instance, are bound to invest their incomes in institutional activities), wouldn’t be wiser – and truly consistent with the proclaimed aim to enhance the diffusion of culture and information – to adopt a mechanism of open paying access, instead than across-the board holding fast to the excludent paradigm?

The Max Planck Institute (MPI) went further and affirmed that data mining exception should apply also to commercial uses “as far as concerns content to which the persons performing the mining have lawful access” (see MPI position paper available here). Data mining relates to new analysis techniques to process large amounts of data, particularly to identify correlations and trends, which can be helpful in different sectors (health, marketing, IoT, etc.). In this regards, as acknowledged by Recital 8 “text and data mining may involve acts protected by copyright and/or by the sui generis database right, notably the reproduction of works or other subject-matter and/or the extraction of contents from a database”. Therefore, a general data mining exception would limit copyright and database rights. In this regard, the MPI says instead that data mining should be regarded as a normal use of a work, not requiring further authorization once a lawful access to the work is obtained. On the contrary, the new exception should be extended to cover data mining for research purposes even in cases of unauthorized access to protected works, i.e. research organizations should be able to carry out data mining without having to acquire access to the protected works.

We agree on that view. We however add that, in light of the concurring collective interests, data mining for commercial purposes should not in any case be subject to exclusive rights but rather to a regime of open paying access: business entities should be able to carry out data mining without having to acquire a general access to the protected works but rather by paying a reasonable fee/compensation.

  1. Use of out-of-commerce works by cultural heritage institutions

The Proposal provides for non-exclusive licences stipulated by collective management organizations with cultural heritage institutions for the digitisation, distribution communication and making available to the public of out-of-commerce works whose copyright belongs also to right holders not represented by the collective management organization – and this with cross-border effect (Arts 7-8).

The mechanism that empowers cultural institutions to (store and also) publish works ‘out-of-commerce’ is quite precarious, as the rightholders “may at any time object to their works…be deemed to be out of commerce and exclude the application of the licence to their works” (Art. 7,1.c). And this, without any obligation to resume the publication of the ‘forgotten’ works. As matter of fact, in its weakness, the new regime apparently amounts to a tentative compromise solution with the principle, recently re-stated by the CJEU in interpreting InfoSoc, whereby collecting societies cannot by their own initiative (i.e. substituting themselves to authors) authorize cultural institutions to digitise, store, communicate and make available to the public out-of-commerce works (CJEU, 11 November 2016, case C-301/15, Soulier and Doke).

  1. New rights on press publications against digital uses

The Proposal introduces (Art. 11) a new right, lasting 20 years, in favour of newspapers and magazines publishers to bar third parties (except the authors of the articles) from unauthorized extraction and online exploitation of even short, even very short (‘snippets’), parts of published articles.

This provision represents a ‘hardened’ version of the German Copyright Law which – possibly on the blueprint of an ancient jurisprudence of French origin – instead condoned the extraction and use of ‘imperceptible thefts’ (‘larcins imperceptibles’).

This right is commonly labelled “ancillary”: in truth it is a straight copyright (albeit with a reduced term) since it simply confirms the faculty of copyright holders’ (newspapers and magazine publishers) to grant or deny the authorization to exploit derivative works. Excerpts are indeed ‘reductions’, typically derivative works (hence included in the provision of Art. 12 of Berne Convention): works ultimately similar to the ‘condensed (sic.) books’ traditionally published by the American magazine Reader’s Digest. And the extreme brevity of the extracted text does not per se deny – particularly considering the typical ultra-synthetic mode of today’s digital communications – that the ‘snippet’ can well feature an ‘informational product’ as such apt to be sold and/or draw advertising revenues. Thus subtracted to the publishers of the original article.

However, the basic weakness of the new provision consists, again, in shaping a straight excluding right (just grazed by the research/teaching exception), i.e. remaining stuck to a proprietary approach to facts-assembling (are we introducing copyright on information and facts?). Which (contrast with Feist’s liberal inspiration aside) represents an objective factor of slowdown of the circulation of culture and information.

Once again, wouldn’t it have been wiser to adopt an ‘open paying access’ scheme in dealing with (derivative) commercial journalistic uses of copyrighted materials? For example by sharing part of the actual incomes generated by the derivative uses, if any.

In sum, the trumpet-announced ‘new copyright for the digital age’ is still fundamentally the old closed monad, just renovated with a few narrow windows. This indeed seems the solution adopted also for User Generated Contents (“UGCs”).

  1. Mandatory cooperation between ISPs and copyright holders on UGCs

The Proposal (Art. 13) tries to regulate UGC platforms. It imposes ISPs to “take measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their works or other subject-matter or to prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the service providers”.

As regard the imposition of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their works the Proposal is justified as it compensate copyright holders by placing on ISPs the burden of the unauthorised use of protected works on UGC platforms (which ISPs monetize), possibly by sharing part of advertising revenues.

However, the Proposal raises some concerns as it seems – again – dictated exclusively by the tentative of expanding the copyright scope. First, it is not coordinated with E-Commerce Directive and its safe harbour provisions: who are the ISPs concerned? What about “passive” ISPs and the ban of monitoring obligations on the net? In fact, a general obligation to prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the service providers should be imposed exclusively on “active” providers and should be carefully intended as a exception of the net neutrality principle.

Second, albeit the copyright scope is extended over the e-commerce safe harbours, there is no attempt to expand and adapt the existing framework of copyright exceptions to the online environment. And this despite the fragmented and restrictive implementation of InfoSoc’s exceptions list. This is particularly the case of those exceptions that could better fit online uses, i.e., quotation right (Infosoc Art. 5,3.d), parody (Art. 5,3.k) and incidental inclusion of works in other materials (Art. 5,3.i). In most cases restrictively transposed into national laws (where implemented). In other words, the formalized obligation to monitor UGC platforms is not balanced by any legal tools to safeguard new fair uses deserving areas of freedom. Additionally, online monitoring programs used by copyright holders – that would in fact be supported by the Proposal – can difficulty distinguish “fair” uses. Thus, it should have been advisable at least imposing to Member States to fully transpose all InfoSoc exceptions without reducing their scope. With no need to recall what already observed about the three-step test and the need of adapting it as a balancing criterion rather than an exclusive restrictive mechanism.

  1. Fair remuneration in contracts of authors and performers

An innovation that deserves full approval is instead the modified regime of contractual relations authors-publishers that allows the former to request not only an improvement of the level of royalties previously agreed upon, but also (read Art. 14.1 and 2, in functional connection with Art. 15), a fair share of the revenues from the ‘other’ sources of income, i.e. advertising, commercial offers, public representations, etc. In case of disagreement, the dispute author/publisher might be entrusted to ADR (Art. 16).

Realistically, though, the chances to achieve such revisions will depend on general agreements stipulated by collecting societies and publishers’ associations – ultimately, by said societies and the major ‘platforms’.

However, this provision is of high systemic relevance, as it allows alterations of the contractually agreed balance of the parties’ interests beyond the classical boundary of exceptional/unforeseeable new supervening circumstances of dramatic economic impact. And, above all, it fills a manifest lacuna of the InfoSoc Directive, which, as hinted above, is missed: the chance of a regulatory support of new ‘business models’ of dissemination of the works associated with the advent of the Internet and digital technology. Models often characterized by no payment obligation for the user for the enjoyment of single works disseminated online, and where the commercial revenues stem in whole or in part from advertising and the sale of various services and other similar sources. Hence, InfoSoc failed also to defend the legitimate rights of authors to obtain their slice of the pie of these other commercial revenues however stemming from the exploitation, direct or indirect, of their works – especially vis-à-vis ‘free’ online distribution models.

Punitive damages for IP infringement and the Enforcement Directive: some thoughts on the OTK decision

On 25 January last, just a few months after the Liffers (here, and on IPlens) and Hansson (here) judgments, the EU Court of Justice issued another decision under Article 267 TFEU on compensation for IP infringement (OTK, C-367/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:36: here).

The case concerned the compatibility with Article 13 of Directive 2004/48 (the Enforcement Directive) of a provision of the Polish copyright law whereby, in the case of infringement, the copyright holder may be awarded a sum of money consisting of two or three times the amount of the hypothetical royalty.

Pending the referral proceedings, the above national provision was declared unconstitutional by the Trybunał Konstytucyjny (the Polish Constitutional Court) insofar as it provided for compensation amounting to “three times” the hypothetical royalty. As a consequence, the scope of the EUCJ’s analysis was narrowed to “duplication” of the hypothetical royalty.

However, while triplication of the hypothetical royalty (at least in many cases) quite blatantly amounts to a punishment, duplication thereof may also be viewed as a way of ensuring that IP holders are fully compensated for the damage they have suffered. Therefore, the decision of the Polish Constitutional Court gave the EUCJ the opportunity to answer the preliminary question posed by the referring Court without explicitly ruling on the compatibility of punitive damages with the Enforcement Directive. An opportunity which – at least at first sight – the EUCJ did not miss.

After stating that

Directive 2004/48 lays down a minimum standard concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights and does not prevent the Member States from laying down measures that are more protective” (paragraph 23)

and that

the fact that Directive 2004/48 does not entail an obligation on the Member States to provide for ‘punitive’ damages cannot be interpreted as a prohibition on introducing such a measure” (paragraph 28)

the Court went on to state that

without there being any need to rule on whether or not the introduction of ‘punitive’ damages would be contrary to Article 13 of Directive 2004/48, it is not evident that the provision applicable in the main proceedings entails an obligation to pay such damages” (paragraph 29), in view of the circumstance that “mere payment of the hypothetical royalty is not capable of guaranteeing compensation in respect of all the loss actually suffered, given that payment of that royalty would not, in itself, ensure reimbursement of any costs — referred to in recital 26 of Directive 2004/48 — that are linked to researching and identifying possible acts of infringement, compensation for possible moral prejudice … or payment of interest on the sums due” (paragraph 30).

In the light of the above, it would be fair to think that the Court did not believe the issue of punitive damages to be at stake in the case at hand; that, in the Court’s view, the Polish provision in question did not provide for punitive damages; and that, therefore, the Court saw no reasons for (again, explicitly) ruling on the compatibility of such damages with Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive.

However, in paragraph 31, the Court concludes its reasoning by admitting that a doubled “hypothetical royalty” may exceed the loss actually suffered by the IP holder: and, “in exceptional cases, may exceed it “so clearly and substantially that a claim to that effect could constitute an abuse of rights, prohibited by Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48”.

So, quite interestingly, when it deals with the case of the IP holder being awarded a sum exceeding the actual loss as a result of the application of the Polish provision at stake, the Court does not make any reference to Article 13 and to the expression “damages appropriate to the actual prejudice” contained therein. In line with its conception of the Directive as a “minimum standard” (paragraph 23), the Court only relies, with regard to damages exceeding the actual loss, on the concept of abuse of right provided by Article 3(2). And this seems to be an implicit acknowledgment of the admissibility of punitive damages under Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive. Indeed, on the one hand, damages which exceed (even if not “clearly” and “substantially”) the actual loss suffered by the IP holder are not compensatory, but punitive. On the other hand, an abuse of right entails the existence of a right. Thus, it might be inferred from paragraph 31 of the reasoning that, according to the Court, the Directive does not prevent national laws from providing IP holders with the right to be awarded damages which exceed the actual loss they suffered – that is, punitive damages. However, the right in question, just like any other, should not be abused. And, in this regard, the Court appears to find in the general Member States’ obligation to provide for safeguards against the abuse of rights under Article 3(2) of the Directive the sole limit to punitive damages laid down by the Directive itself. The Court does not precisely indicate when claiming damages which exceed the actual loss constitutes an abuse of right. It simply says that claiming damages which clearly and substantially exceed the actual loss may amount to an abuse, thus leaving unsolved the issue of what “clearly” and “substantially” mean.

The Court decision, in this perspective, appears to be in flagrant contrast with the opinion (here) of Advocate General Sharpston (who pointed out that, under the Enforcement Directive, compensation should be appropriate and proportionate to the actual prejudice suffered by the IP holder).

It may be noticed that a provision almost identical to the Polish one was contained in the Proposal for a Directive on measures and procedures to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights presented by the Commission on January 2003 (here). Under Article 17 of the Proposal [which, contrary to Article 13 and recital 26 of the Enforcement Directive, expressly referred to both compensatory and non-compensatory damages]:

“… the competent authorities shall award, at the request of the prejudiced party:

(a)  … damages set at double the royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question.

And, in such respect, the Commission’s Executive Memorandum (here) read as follows:

This provision does not constitute punitive damages; rather, it allows for compensation based on an objective criterion while taking account of the expense incurred by the right holder such as administrative expenses incurred in identifying the infringement and researching its origin”.

*** . *** . ***

The issue of punitive damages is a very hot one. In Italy, such damages have traditionally been considered as contrary to the public order (see, for all, Court of Cassation, 19 January 2007, no. 1183). However, quite recently [1], the I Civil Division of the Italian Court of Cassation submitted the issue to the President of the Court of Cassation for the possible consideration of the Joint Divisions of the same Court of Cassation, also in view of the presence in the Italian legal system of provisions which may be read as providing for punitive damages. So far, no decision has been rendered by the Court of Cassation in this respect. However, it is not unlikely that the Court will change its traditional stance.

In this context, it is worth remembering that Article 68(2) of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court clearly provides that “The infringer shall not benefit from the infringement. However, damages shall not be punitive”. Thus, at least in (unitary) patent matters, the issue might be considered to be resolved.

Riccardo Perotti

[1] Order no. 9978 of 16 May 2016, available here.

EU Court of Justice, 25 January 2017, Stowarzyszenie ‘Oławska Telewizja Kablowa’ v Stowarzyszenie Filmowców PolskichC-367/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:36.