Cloud Service Providers and the active role in communicating online digital contents


Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) are relatively new intermediaries acting as “service providers” within the meaning of the Directive 2000/31/EC (i.e. any natural or legal person providing an information society service). They are commonly intended as the suppliers of the virtualized technical infrastructures where digital contents can be stored, distributed or communicated to the public and where computing resources can be shared between a number of clients. Thus, CSPs are usually not involved into responsibilities for illicit activities conducted through their means, since their role is considered merely passive in providing the technical infrastructure used by the clients.

It is worth noting that in some recent EU case law (see CJEU, C-265/16, V-CAST case) and in the process of approval of the a new EU Copyright Directive in the Digital Single Market (see the draft text approved last September by the European Parliament here and our comments here and here) are emerging signs of evolutions in the categorization of the CSPs, with a distinction between “active” CSPs and “passive” CSPs. This process seems not different from what has already happened in the context of the categorization of hosting service providers, where an higher level of responsibility is requested to those providers which play an “active” role (see our previous posts here, here and here).

Definition of Cloud Service Providers

Since there is no legal definition of CSPs available at EU level, the notion of CSP has to be reconstructed in different sources of law, at national and international level (see here). In the Italian legal system AgID – Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale introduced (see here) a legal definition of Cloud as “a set of remote technical resources utilized as virtual resources for memorization and elaboration in the context of a service”. According to this definition, the main features of the Cloud are that: (a) it entails a set of technical  resources that are remotely available (this means essentially via online connection); (b) the resources are considered as virtual resources (this means only for their overall processing capacity and not as the sum of single hardware and software); (c) the resources are used for offering specific services (this means that there is a clear distinction between the services offered and the equipment used for providing such services).

There are some differences between this definition and other definitions available at international level. According to the NIST, the US National Institute of Standards and Technologies, “Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” According to the EU Communication on the European Cloud Initiative dated 19th April 2016– COM (2016) 178, “the Cloud can be understood as the combination of three interdependent elements: the data infrastructures which store and manage data; the high-bandwidth networks which transport data; and the ever more powerful computers which can be used to process the data.

The NIST definition is more oriented to describe functional aspects of Cloud and the advantages in terms of accessibility and modularity of Cloud services, while the EU Commission definition focuses on structural and network aspects of Cloud. The AgID definition sounds pretty generic and does not mention some peculiar features of Cloud, such as the share of resources, the access on demand, the minimal management effort, the connection with high-bandwidth networks; the absence of such features entails that a wider variety of services can be considered Cloud services under the AgID Rules, even if they do not necessarily have some peculiar features of Cloud services.

The V-Cast case and the distinction between “active” and “passive” Cloud Service Providers

In the recent EU case law between V-Cast and RTI, the CJEU has ruled on a video-recording service of TV broadcasts through Cloud storage. The main result of this judgment of the Court is that V-Cast video-recording service has been found illicit in light of the Infosoc Directive. More in detail, the Court ruled that the Infosoc Directive, in particular Article 5(2)(b) thereof, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which permits a commercial undertaking to provide private individuals with a Cloud service for the remote recording of private copies of works protected by copyright, by means of a computer system, by actively involving itself in the recording, without the rightholder’s consent. An interesting aspect of this decision seems to be the distinction drawn by the Court between “active” and “passive” Cloud Service Providers. Indeed, by describing the conditions under which the active CSP can be found liable, the Court seems implicitly enucleating also the conditions under which the passive CSP cannot be considered liable.

V-Cast is a company incorporated in the UK which makes available to its customers via the Internet a video-recording system, in storage space within the Cloud, for terrestrial programmes of the Italian broadcaster RTI, among others. The user selects a programme on the V-Cast website, which includes all the programming from the television channels covered by the V-Cast service. The user can specify either a certain programme or a time slot. The system operated by V-Cast then picks up the television signal using its own antennas and records the time slot for the selected programme in the Cloud data storage space indicated by the user. The storage space in the Cloud is purchased by the user from another provider.

More in detail, according to the CJEU under Article 5(2)(b) of the Directive 2001/29/CE, Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction right in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial. Moreover, Article 5(5) of this Directive states that the exceptions and limitations provided for, inter alia, in Article 5(2) of the Directive will only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightsholder.

The Court has clarified that, in order to apply the exception for private copying, it is not necessary that the technical means used for reproduction purposes are directly available to the private users but they can be provided also by third party operators. The core element to figure out the correct legal interpretation is the type of activity offered by V-Cast to its users. In the Court’s opinion, such activity cannot be considered as a mere supply of Cloud storage, also because the storage itself is not provided by V-Cast but by another provided on behalf of V-Cast. V-Cast was offering a more comprehensive service, inclusive of the (unauthorized) access to the RTI broadcasts over DTT, their reproduction and conversion into another format for distribution over the Internet and their storage, on user’s request, in a Cloud storage service for subsequent access by users.

The service offered by V-Cast does not amount only to a violation of the reproduction right, since no private copying exception is applicable to such service, but can also be considered illicit according to Article 3 of the Directive 2001/29/CE, which prohibits any unauthorized communication to the public, including the making available of a protected work or subject matter, given that, as is apparent from recital 23 of the Directive, the right of communication of works to the public should be understood in a broad sense covering any transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting.

Even if the Court’s judgment is very specific and tailor-made for the V-Cast service, it is also interesting to understand what can be arguable reading this judgment a contrario. The mere provision of Cloud storage services of audio-visual contents, with reproductions made on individual requests of end-users, could be considered, at certain conditions, covered by the private copying exception since: (i) it is not a necessary requisite the fact that the users possess the reproduction means or equipment, given that such reproduction can be made also via means or equipment made available by third-party operators (§ 35 of the judgment); (ii) the provider which merely organizes the reproduction on behalf of the users could be considered within the limits of the private copying exception, where the provider does not play an active role and does not interfere with other exclusive rights, such as the communication to the public (§ 37-38 of the judgment).

The proposal of amendments to the EU Copyright Directive: the role of passive CSPs

The distinction between active and passive CSPs is part of the discussions around the proposal of a new Copyright Directive in the Digital Single Market, at least according to the Amendments to such Directive adopted by the European Parliament on 12 September 2018. With the Amendment 143 for introducing a new Recital 37 a, the European Parliament has proposed to introduce the definition of an Online Content Sharing Service Provider, which should encompass those Providers the main purposes of which is to store and give access to the public or to stream significant amounts of copyright protected content uploaded / made available by its users, and that optimise content, and promote for profit making purposes, including amongst others displaying, tagging, curating, sequencing, the uploaded works or other subject-matter, irrespective of the means used therefor, and therefore act in an active way.

The definition of Online Content Sharing Service Provider is relevant also because such Providers should not benefit from the liability exemption provided for in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC (i.e. the safe harbour provision for hosting providers). What is relevant for excluding certain providers from the safe harbour regime is the fact that certain providers play an active role, in different ways (but mainly with an intervention aimed at creating added value in the supply of user generated contents), since the safe harbour regime was originally thought for mere technical service providers (in Recital 32 of the E-Commerce Directive is made clear that the role of the ISP which can enjoy limitations to liability “… is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored”).

In its proposal of amendments, the European Parliament has expressly mentioned that also “Providers of cloud services for individual use which do not provide direct access to the public … should not be considered online content sharing service providers within the meaning of this Directive”. This provision, if approved, should be for the benefit of mere Cloud storage services, such as Dropbox o iCloud, where the request of reproduction is made by the private users and also the access to the stored contents is limited to the users with an account associated to those stored contents. This approach seems not far from the conclusions of the CJEU in the V-Cast case, at least considering what are the features of an active CSP in the opinion of the Court, and is the clear sign of the emerging distinction from a legal standpoint between active and passive Cloud Service Providers.

Gianluca Campus

CJEU – Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 29 November 2017; VCAST Limited v RTI SpA; ECLI:EU:C:2017:913

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 12 September 2018 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market (COM(2016)0593 – C8-0383/2016 – 2016/0280(COD))

European Parliament approves the DSM Copyright Directive Proposal

In yesterday’s session, the European Parliament approved the proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market [see our previous comments here, here, and a more detailed position paper, here]. MEPs voted 438-226 with 39 abstentions.

Here is the text passed – a compromise solution that slightly changes from the previous version rejected by the European Parliament back in July.

Among the most controversial provisions:

  • the text and data mining (TDM) exception has been confirmed in its original structure (limited to research organizations). The new version adds an optional additional TDM exception (Article 3a) that applies in favor of lawful users except such TDM usage has been expressly reserved by the right holder.
  • the ancillary right for press publishers (art. 11) has been slightly amended:

1. Member States shall provide publishers of press publications with the rights provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC so that they may obtain fair and proportionate remuneration for the digital use of  their press publications by information society service providers.

1a. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall not prevent legitimate private and non-commercial use of press publications by individual users.


2a. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall not extend to mere hyperlinks which are accompanied by individual words.

4. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall expire 5 years after the publication of the press publication. This term shall be calculated from the first day of January of the year following the date of publication. The right referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply with retroactive effect.

Recital 33 specifies that “the protection shall also not extend to factual information which is reported in journalistic articles from a press publication and will therefore not prevent anyone from reporting such factual information”. This seems a bit in contrast with the provision of 2a that allows reporting only “individual words”.

  • As regards article 13, filtering obligations have been only apparently removed, since in case right holders are not happy to license their contents, UGC platforms shall cooperate to block such contents

1. Without prejudice to Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC, online content sharing service providers perform an act of communication to the public.  They shall therefore conclude fair and appropriate licensing agreements with right holders.

2. Licensing agreements which are concluded by online content sharing service providers with right holders for the acts of communication referred to in paragraph 1, shall cover the liability for works uploaded by the users of such online content sharing services in line with the terms and conditions set out in the licensing agreement, provided that such users do not act for commercial purposes.

2a. Member States shall provide that where right holders do not wish to conclude licensing agreements, online content sharing service providers and right holders shall cooperate in good faith in order to ensure that unauthorised protected works or other subject matter are not available on their services. Cooperation between online content service providers and right holders shall not lead to preventing the availability of non-infringing works or other protected subject matter, including those covered by an exception or limitation to copyright. […]

Article 2(4b) sets out a very complex definition of the UGC platforms affected, taking into account the CJEU case law: “‘online content sharing service provider’ means a provider of an information society service one of the main purposes of which is to store and give access to the public to a significant amount of copyright protected works or other protected subject-matter uploaded by its users, which the service optimises and promotes for profit making purposes“. Recital 37a adds that this is “including amongst others displaying, tagging, curating, sequencing, the uploaded works or other subject-matter, irrespective of the means used therefor, and therefore act in an active way.” It then excludes from the definition of online content sharing service providers microenterprises and small sized enterprises, as well as service non-commercial providers such as online encyclopaedia or providers of online services where the content is uploaded with the authorisation of all right holders concerned, such as educational or scientific repositories.

Article 12a protecting sport event organizers has been introduced at a later stage (with no impact assessment).

This compromized version shows some slight improvements, despite the original defects of the Proposal still remain unsolved. Now the trilogue negotiations amongst the Parliament, the Council and the Commission will start.

Francesco Banterle


Copyright protection of algorithms does not prevent the disclosure of their source code in the context of administrative proceedings

Algorithms are often used for managing complex administrative proceedings where multiple data and parameters have to be analysed to produce a result. Since algorithms can be protected under copyright laws as software (including their source code), it is questionable whether copyright protection might limit the right to access of interested parties in administrative proceedings. In two recent cases (here and here), the Italian Administrative Court of Lazio (TAR Lazio) has clarified the nature of the electronic administrative document and the scope of the right to access pursuant to Law n. 241/1990 with regard to the source code of an algorithm compiled by a software house on request by the Public Administration. The cases at stake have been promoted by a number of Italian trade unions against the Ministry of University and Education (“MUIR”) with the purposes of gaining access to the source code of the algorithm used by MUIR to manage the territorial relocation of school professors under mobility procedures.

Upon first request, the MUIR refused access to the source code of the algorithm developed by a software house on MUIR’s request on basis of the following arguments: (i) the source code itself cannot be considered part of the electronic administrative document and, consequently, does not imply the right to access of interested parties in administrative proceedings, and (ii) the source code enjoys the copyright protection as software and the access to the source code would prejudice the intellectual property rights of the software house. More in detail, MUIR has held that the disclosure of a document describing the way of functioning of the algorithm could be considered sufficient protection for the trade unions and that the Legislative Decree n. 97/2016 (Art. 6) on the civic right to access (for preventing corruption and enhancing transparency in the public sector) expressly excludes access to the acts of the Public Administration when the access could prejudice the economic interest of private parties, thus included their intellectual property rights.

In the Administrative Court’s opinion, the MUIR must allow access to the source code of the algorithm since it can be considered part of the administrative proceeding subject to the right to access of interested parties. MUIR has requested the software house to compile the algorithm with the specific purpose of managing in electronic form the public procedure of territorial relocation of school professors under mobility, according to public rules and collective employment agreements. From a structural point of view, the outputs of the algorithm: (i) are the results of the combination/elaboration of data collected in various endoprocedural acts and (ii) make application of the public rules on territorial mobility.

Taking into consideration the ratio of the right to access in administrative procedures, also the source code of the algorithm enjoys the nature of electronic administrative document and such nature implies that right to access should be allowed also with regards to algorithm. Reasoning to the contrary will lead to the unacceptable consequense that the right to access could be automatically excluded by decision of the Public Administration to manage the administrative proceeding by electronic means. TAR Lazio further clarified the notion of electronic administrative document which, in the Court’s opinion, should not include only those administrative documents formed via electronic means (for the purpose of documentation) but should also include those administrative documents where the elaboration of contents and data (for the purpose of issuing an output) are taken into account.

Also the copyright protection of software (which encompasses also the source code) has not been considered by the Court as an argument for excluding the right to access to the algorithm. First of all, TAR Lazio acknowledges that software can be protected under copyright laws not only as an informatic language but also as a creative work resulting from the use of a certain informatic language. In the case at stake, the algorithm is a software created for a specific purpose of the Public Administration and, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the agreement between the PA and software house, can be assumed that the software house has transferred to the PA all the economic rights in the algorithm. In the Court’s opinion, the nature of creative work of the algorithm should not interfere with the right to access in the administrative proceedings of interested parties, since the right to access does not prejudice the right to exploitation of intellectual properties (any reproduction made by the interested parties is functional to the exercise of rights to control the administrative proceeding only and not to the commercial exploitation of the algorithm).

In addition, TAR LAZIO considered that is not relevant for excluding the right to access to the source code of the algorithm the fact that: (i) the source code is a pure informatic language unreadable by the public officers and written by a private company (i.e. the software house on behalf of the PA) and (ii) the source code is compiled for the mere application of public rules and collective labour agreements, which are accessible themselves even without direct access to the source code. The Court ruled in favour of the right to access to the source code also on the basis that what impact the giuridical position of private individuals are the outputs of the algorithm.

These interesting administrative rulings offer a clear and deep reconstruction of the notion of electronic administrative document (expanding such notion to include also algorithms) but should be subject to further analysis with regards to the asserted strike of balance between the right to access and the protection under copyright laws of the source code, exspecially taking into consideration possible future cases where the PA should make use of algorithms: (a) not specifically developed for a single administrative proceeding (under the assumption of a complete transfer of intellectual property rights) and/or (b) based on more sophisticated technologies licensed to the PA under a proprietary scheme.

Gianluca Campus

TAR Lazio, case No.  3742/2017, 21 March 2017, CISL, UIL, SNALS Vs MUIR (President of the Court: Hon. R. Savoia; Judge-Rapporteur Hon. M.C. Quiligotti)

TAR Lazio, case No.  3769/2017, 22 March 2017, Gilda Vs MUIR (President of the Court: Hon. R. Savoia; Judge-Rapporteur Hon. M.C. Quiligotti)

First results of the public consultation on revision of the EU Database Directive

Last 6 October, the European Commission published the first results of the public consultation on revision of the Database Directive 96/9/EC (here) that took place between 24 May and 30 August 2017 (here).

Among the various initiatives to foster European data economy, the European Commission is conducting an ex-post evaluation of the Database Directive. In its view, the Directive should play a key role in increasing legal certainty for database makers and users, and enhancing the re-use of data.

There is however little evidence regarding the application and effects of the Directive. The previous report published in 2005 concluded that “the economic impact of the ‘sui generis’ right on database production is unproven” (here). The 2005 Report (not really positive) invited for more analysis on the Directive’s effects.

After more than 10 years, where the CJEU had to clarify the boundaries of the sui generis right, the aim of the consultation is “to understand how the Database Directive, and in particular the sui generis protection of databases, is used, to evaluate its impact on users and to identify possible needs of adjustment”.

The European Commission asked in particular if:

  1. by creating the sui generis right, the Directive has protected investment in the creation updating or maintenance of a database
  2. the Directive is encouraging investments in advances information processing systems
  3. the Directive reached a good balance between interest of rightholders and users
  4. the Directive has achieved harmonisation
  5. national contract law give more legal certainty than sui generis protection when it comes to prevention of extracting or re-using database content
  6. the Directive still fit for purpose in an increasingly data driven economy

Respondents were a mix of business, academics/research institutions, trade associations, and non-governmental organizations.

At a first glance views are divided, particularly in relation to whether [I have tried to count the answers, including the report of the anonymous replies, taking aside hesitant positions – so apologies for any inaccuracy]:

  • the Directive sufficiently protects investments in creating databases (II.2.1) – pro: 45 / contra 25
  • the Directive has achieved its objective to protect and stimulate a wide variety of databasesand innovation in advanced processing systems (II.2.2) – pro: 38/ contra 39, and development of the data market (II.3.9) – pro: 39/ contra 39
  • the current scope of the sui generisright is still satisfactory (III.5.1) pro (satisfactory – too narrow): 42 / contra (too broad – unclear): 53
  • the original objectives of the Directive are still in line with the needs of the EU (III.1) – pro: 53/ contra 39
  • the Directive is coherent with the EU Data Economy Package objectives (III.4.4) pro: 27 / contra: 34
  • the sui generis right has brought more legal certainty for database makers (II.3.1) – pro: 43 / contra: 42, and lawful users (II.3.2) – pro: 38 / contra: 47
  • the Directive achieves a good balance between interests of rightholders and users (II.2.4) – pro: 32 / contra 49
  • the Directive had a positive effect on (i) access to data (II.3.5) – pro 29 / contra (negative or no effect) 57; or (ii) re-use of data (II.3.6) – pro: 30 / contra (negative or no effect) 51
  • national case law gives more legal certainty than the sui generis right (II.2.6) – pro: 30 / contra: 35
  • whether the Directive still fit for purpose in an increasingly data driven economy (2g) – pro: 36 / contra: 47
  • whether the restriction drawn by the CJEU on the scope of the sui generis right (i.e., no protection of the investment made in the creation of data) had positive effect on the scope of the protection of database (III.9.1) – pro: 33 / contra: 27
  • The sui generis right should apply to databases which contain automatically collected and/or machine-generated data (III.10.2) – pro: 20 / contra: 36

As said, opinions are divided, although at a first glance, the general outcome seems not very positive.

It is difficult to foresee which adjustments the European Commission is willing to propose, if any. It is known that the introduction of the sui generis right has been largely criticized (going in the opposite direction than that endorsed by Feist in the US). And it does not seem that any other country has been inspired by and replicated our EU database protection system. Both the 2005 evaluation and this public consultation highlighted that the subject matter and the extension of the sui generis right are often unclear. Indeed, the CJEU intervention has been necessary to limit an excessive extension and the possibility to protect the investments in the creation of data (only those relating collection, verification and presentation of data can be protected – see here and here). However, the points raised in this consultation seem to suggest that the European Commission is trying to question the CJEU approach. The European Commission indeed has inquired about the respondents’ approval of the CJEU interpretation (to ask whether they would instead include also the creation of data under the database right) and whether businesses have appetite to explore the extension of rights also in non-personal raw data (machine generated data), at the moment excluded by the scope of the database right (that requires the investment in the “organization” of data – i.e., the contrary of “raw” data). Thus it seems that apparently the goal is finding confirmations from the market to legitimize a stronger legislative approach to data.

As a confirmation, the European Commission has already launched at least two other recent consultations about the opportunity to strengthen the legislative approach to data, respectively in (i) 2016, see the “Synopsis report – public consultation on the regulatory environment for data and cloud computing”, of 12 May 2016 here at § 4.2.4.; and (ii) in 2017, see the “Synopsis report – public consultation on building a European data economy, of 7 September 2017, here, at p. 5. However, the answer of the market seems always the same: the data value chains are extremely varied, making it difficult to design one-size-fits-all solutions, and freedom of contract should prevail (see here for our comments against the introduction of new exclusive rights in data).

Instead, adjustment can be introduced in the boundaries of the exclusive given by the sui generis right, such as the concept of “substantiality” of the extraction/re-use (Art. 7 of the Database Directive) and – above all – exceptions. Exceptions – especially those for research – should be made mandatory and not optional (see Articles 6.2 and 9 of Database Directive). In this regard, it should also be advisable to introduce the Text and Data Mining (TDM) exception suggested by the DSM Copyright Directive Proposal (see our comments here). However, we repeat that the new exception should allow also TDM for commercial purposes although based on compensation (paying access), in order to stimulate auto-regulation and new access schemes. TDM is not competing with the exploitation of the original database (in line with Art. 8.2 of the Database Directive) and seems instead a good mechanism to ensure flexibility and open data (that is a real instrument to foster a European data market).

In any case, the public consultation should push the European Commission to analyze the economic impact of the ‘sui generis’ right, in order to justify its stay in the EU acquis. We will keep monitoring the next communications from the European Commission on this issue.

Francesco Banterle

The relevance of profit for the qualification of an act of communication to the public according to the Italian Court of Frosinone

The decision of the Court of Frosinone, published on February 2017 (available here), relies on a criminal investigation carried out by the Italian Tax Police earlier in 2014 against several websites that shared protected contents without the authorization of the right holders. Among these websites, there was also

The users of were allowed to access without right holders’ consent a large number of movies and TV series through hyperlinks posted on the website. However, before being able to check the list of links that redirected to other websites, users were forced to see advertising banners.

The Italian Tax Police initially requested the Review Court of Rome, competent to rule on precautionary measures, to grant the preventive seizure of the website to exclude any further access to the infringing material. Other than expected, the Court rejected the request considering that the information insofar collected by the Tax Police was insufficient to prove the capacity of the advertising banners to produce profit in favor of the website’s holder, considering the profit purpose crucial to grant any precautionary measure against

Following further investigations, the Tax Police found out that after the first instance request, the websites and the affiliated websites and, automatically redirected to the website According to the Tax Police, it was highly reasonable that all the domains were managed by the same person (‘s holder), who set the redirection to bypass any possible block applied against and the other affiliated websites.

The evidence presented before the Prefecture of Frosinone in the administrative proceedings was instead considered sufficient by the Judge to issue a fine of Euros 546,528.69 according to Article 171-ter, para. 2, letter a-bis of the Italian Copyright Act (which punishes everyone who “In violation of art. 16 of the Copyright Act, for profit, communicates to the public a copyright-protected work or part of it, by entering it into a system of telematic networks, by means of connections of any kind”).

The infringer appealed the administrative sanction before the Court of Frosinone which overruled the Prefecture’s decision. According to the Court the Italian Copyright Act requires the unauthorized communication to the public to be performed for profit, namely the intention to gain a consistent economic advantage or patrimonial increase from the infringer’s illegal conduct. It follows that the hyperlinker cannot be sanctioned for the sole act of linking to unauthorized protected material, but it is necessary that this leads to a considerable economic benefit.

In the case at stake, the evidence collected was deemed not sufficient to prove that the creator of,, and was obtaining any significant profit from his/her activity.

The Court of Frosinone has been one of the first in Italy to deal with the linking issue after the CJEU recent cases (particularly Svensson, GS Media and more recently the Pirate Bay case).

The meaning of “profit” – and the possibility to detect the existence of such purpose – assumes in the case at stake a prominent relevance. The same factor has been considered also in the CJEU case law, leading to different conclusions.

In the GS Media case (available here), the CJEU did not clarify what should be intended as “lucrative purpose”, though the Court specified that the presence of the profit intention is relevant to determine whether the conduct of the hyperlinker amounts to an “act of communication to the public”. In fact, in case hyperlinking is made for profit it must be assumed that it has been made following previous controls, from which the hyperlinker should have verified that the work in question is not unlawfully published on the site to which those hyperlinks refer. Even though no lucrative purpose is detected, hyperlinking can still be considered an “act of communication to the public” if the hyperlinker is aware – or should have been reasonably aware – of the fact that said work had been published on the Internet without authorization. In the GS Media case the CJEU asserted that a profit purpose existed. But the absence of lucrative purpose would not have directly led to the exclusion of the hyperlinker’s liability: it would have just implied the need for further evidence (based on the awareness criterion).

In the Pirate Bay case (available here) the EU Court stated: “there can be no dispute that the making available and management of an online sharing platform, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is carried out with the purpose of obtaining profit therefrom, it being clear from the observations submitted to the Court that that platform generates considerable advertising revenues”. In this case, the presence of the profit intention is strictly connected to the fact that the hyperlinker was obtaining “considerable advertising revenues” from its activity, in a way which highly resembles the case held before the Court of Frosinone. Indirect income, such as the one obtained from the advertising banners, might be qualified as source of profit in the way intended by the CJEU in the Pirate Bay case. Moving from this decision, the Court of Frosinone might have qualified the profit incoming from the advertising banners, placed on the websites under investigation, as sufficient to consider fulfilled the requirement prescribed by Article 171-ter of the Italian Copyright Act.

The other way around, the Italian Court seems to have considered that the investigation did not provided enough evidence to prove that the infringer gained an economic benefit from his/her conduct. Without clarifying if, in the Court’s view, this circumstance relied on the impossibility to qualify the advertising banners as a source of profit or, conversely, on the inability to prove that the economic advantage gained was “considerable” (that is the term used by the Court). Such consideration would require assessing when the economic benefit can be deemed “considerable” within the scope of the Italian Copyright Law, in contrast with Article 171-ter which refers only to the profit intention itself regardless any quantification.

The above considerations remain however unanswered since the decision does not share any in depth reasoning about the grounds on which the Court ruled, probably without taking into consideration to the CJEU caselaw.

Miriam Loro Piana

Court of Frosinone, docket No. 1766/2015, 7 February 2017, Unknown vs Prefecture of Frosinone (Judge Gemma Carlomusto)


The Court of Appeal of Milan and the active role of the ISP in selling infringing services via the e-marketplaces White Pages and Yellow Pages

The liability of the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is still an unsettled area of the case law both at European and national level, with a lot of recent cases that deal with ISPs and the unauthorized online distribution of audio-visual contents (see CJEU case C-610/15 and Court of Appeal of Rome – case Break Media – and Court of Turin – case Delta TV). Anyway, there is also another side of the case law on the liability of ISPs that deals with the selling of goods and services which infringe IP rights via e-marketplace (the leading case of the CJEU is case C-324/09 L’Oréal Vs eBay). In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal of Milan (here) shed light on the joint liability of the ISP and the professional users of its services.

The case at stake is based on the alleged infringement of the trademarks of some major manufacturers of domestic appliance (Electrolux, Candy, Ariston, Bosch, Hoover, Smeg and others, collectively the “Claimants”) by the company ABB, with others (the “Defendant”) via some adverts on the Italianonline’s websites White Pages and Yellow Pages. ABB offered maintenance and support services for domestic appliances – on the White Pages and Yellow Pages edited by Italiaonline – using the ABB’s registered trademarks “Boschexpert”, “Candyexpert”, Aristonexpert” and so on. The Court of Milan in first instance held that ABB’s trademarks were void and found ABB liable of trademark infringement and unfair competition against the manufacturers, since the consumers were misled by the use of ABB’s trademarks on the real origin of the support and maintenance services. Italiaonline has been found jointly liable of such IP violations and both ABB and Italiaonline have been ordered to jointly pay damages to the Claimants. Italiaonline reached a settlement with the Claimants while ABB appealed the Court’s ruling of first instance.

The Court of Appeal of Milan has confirmed the ruling of the Court of first instance in terms of determination of the illicit conduct and quantification of the damages but has clarified the position of Italiaonline as ISP whose electronic means have been use for committing an IPR infringement. Indeed, in the first instance Italiaonline has been fully indemnified by ABB since ABB had a preeminent role in the illicit conduct. This seemed to ABB inconsistent, since Italiaonline has been declared jointly liable for the same illicit conduct. According to ABB, Italiaonline as a technical ISP is the sole responsible of the search engine for the adverts on the websites White Pages and Yellow Pages, which results are misleading and determining confusion to the consumers.

According to the Court of Appeal, Italianonline’s websites can be considered Information Society Services pursuant to E-commerce Directive (despite the fact the White Pages and the Yellow Pages are published both in paper and in electronic form). This leads to the fact that Italianonline can be considered a host provider pursuant to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive for the websites White Pages and Yellow Pages, since it technically hosts on such websites the adverts of its professional clients, such as ABB. More in detail, in this case the ISP cannot invoke the safe harbour provision pursuant to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive due to its active role for the third-party adverts in return for payment, where Italiaonline does not merely technically process third party adverts but also edits promotional messages coupled with the third-party adverts and identifies the key-words for its search engine. While playing this active role – according to the Court of Appeals – the ISP is responsible for lack of control and for not having expeditiously removed the infringing adverts after the notices of the Claimants (the earliest ones dated 2003).

With regards to the relation between the infringing activity of ABB and the cooperation of Italialonline, the Court of Appeal found that, even if jointly liable, ABB had effectively a preeminent role in terms of relevance and wilfulness of the conduct and that the joint liability must be evaluated according to Article 2055 of the Italian Civil Code, pursuant to which, where two or more parties are held jointly liable, the party paying the damages can recover from the other parties the pro quota of damages attributable to the level of wilfulness and to the consequences of the conduct of the other parties (so called, right of recourse). The request raised by Italianoneline for indemnification of the damages determined by ABB is considered by the Court of Appeal as a right of recourse aimed at clarifying the pro quota  of responsibility of Italiaonline. The right of recourse is applicable pro quota also to ABB as party paying the damages. In light of this interpretation, the Court of Appeal awarded also to ABB a recourse against Italiaonline equal to the 30% of damages to be paid to the Claimants.

This precedent seems of interest because the Court of Appeal of Milan, while making clear application of the principles set forth by the Court of Justice in the leading European case law L’Oréal Vs eBay (an e-marketplace cannot invoke the safe harbour provisions under E-Commerce Directive if it plays an active role by optimizing and promoting the selling of infringing products or services), has even moved forward by clarifying a possible criterion for the attribution of responsibility between professional users and e-marketplaces. It would be of interest verifying whether the same approach could be adopted by other foreign jurisdictions, since the regime of joint responsibility under tort law seems to be matter of domestic jurisdiction.

Gianluca Campus

Court of Appeal of Milan, case No.  1076/2014, 14 December 2016, Italiaonline Spa Vs ABB Srl and Others (President of the Court: Hon. A.M. Vigorelli; Judge-Rapporteur Hon. F. Fiecconi)

The shape of the worldwide famous Vespa obtains protection in Italy under copyright law

Piaggio, the Italian company producer of the world wide famous Vespa scooter, was recently sued by the Chinese company Zhejiang Zhongneng Industry Group (“ZZIG”) in a quite complex case.

ZZIG offered for sale three scooters named “Revival”, protected by a Community design registration no. 001783655-0002, “Cityzen” and “Ves”, the shape of which was not covered by any registered IP right in Italy or in the European Union.

Capture ZZIG

As to Piaggio, the company owns the Italian 3D trademark no.1556520 claiming priority of the Community trademark no. 011686482, filed on 7 August 2013 and registered on 29 August 2013.

Capture Vespa

When Piaggio obtained the seizure of the three above motorbike models in the context of a Fair held in Milan, the Chinese company started an ordinary proceeding on the merits before the Court of Turin against Piaggio, seeking the declaration of non-infringement of Piaggio Vespa 3D trademark by its “Revival”, “Cityzen” and “Ves” scooters. Besides, it asked a declaration of invalidity of Piaggio’s Vespa trademark, based on the fact that it was anticipated by their design and thus not novel. Also, it held that the 3D trademark was void, as it does not respect the absolute ground for refusal established by the law.

Piaggio resisted and asked the Court of Turin to reject the above claims, declare that the Vespa shape is protected under copyright law, trademark law and unfair competition law and that those rights were infringed by ZIGG three models of scooters. As a matter of fact, Vespa was offered for sale by Piaggio since 1945.

First of all, the Court of Turin declared that the Vespa trademark does not lack of novelty, as it reflects a model of Vespa marketed since 2005, before the commercialization of ZZIG first scooter, i.e. “Cityzen”. Moreover, the Court of Turin excluded the existence of any absolute ground for refusal, stating that its shape was not technical nor standard and not even substantial as the reason why consumers chose the Vespa were not merely aesthetical. Based on these findings, the Court finally affirmed that only the “Ves” scooter constitute an infringement of Piaggio trademark.

This  said, the Court of Turin further held that the Vespa shape is eligible for protection under copyright law, as it is since long time worldwide recognized as an icon of Italian design and style, shown in advertising and movies, presented plenty of times at museum and exhibitions and part of many books, articles, magazines and publications. All considered, safe and sound evidence show that the shape of Vespa is unequivocally believed to be an artistic piece of designs by the main communities of experts worldwide. Nevertheless, the Court held that, again, only Ves scooter infringed Piaggio rights vested on its scooter as it presents features similar to the ones protected both under the Vespa trademark and copyright.

The decision (full text here) is indeed interesting as it critically examines the similarities and differences between the “original” good and the ones that are claimed to be infringing products and, while asserting the eligibility for protection of the Vespa shape both under trademark and copyright law, it excludes infringement for two products through a detailed and careful examination. This narrow approach is indeed interesting because it affirms the principle that the infringement of designs protected under copyright law shall be evaluated with an analytical examination similar to those applied in cases of trademark infringement.

A doubt might remain about the overlapping of trademark and copyright protection. Since the former never expires as long as the product is on the market (plus the subsequent five years, according to Italian law), one might ask what advantage for the right holder might subsist by ‘adding’ a protection limited in time, such as copyright’s. The answer might be: the dual protection functions as a ‘parachute’ for the case that one of the two, in a subsequent Judgement (Appeal or High Court: Cassazione in Italy) should be successfully challenged by a competitor.

Maria Luigia Franceschelli

Court of Turin, case No. 13811/2014, 6 April 2017, Zhejiang Zhongneng Industry Group, Taizhou Zhongneng Import And Export Co. vs Piaggio & c. S.p.a..

Design’s artistic value: no univocal definition according to the Italian Supreme Court

With the decision at stake (dated November 13, 2015, full decision here) on the possible copyright protection of an out-door seat, the Supreme Court interestingly expressed a subtle (but crucial) critic on the current approach adopted by some Italian decisions that seem to ‘generously’ recognize the existence of artistic value for design objects, leaning on apparently weak – or lonely – evidence. This appears to be, for example, the case of the recent decision of the Supreme Court affirming that Moon Boots were artistic, as allegedly proved by the fact that the boots were exposed in an exhibition of industrial design works at the Louvre Museum (see full decision here).

A more severe approach seems to be adopted by the decision in comment, concerning the design of a line of outdoor seats called “Libre”, created by the plaintiff and claimed to be eligible for protection under copyright law. The Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal of Venice excluded the existence of an artistic value and thus excluded any copyright infringement by a line of similar outdoors seat created by a competitor. So, the plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to interpret such notion.

Capture Libre

The Italian Supreme Court, after having made a useful recognition of the current trends adopted by Italian Courts in the interpretation of such requirement, affirmed that the concept of artistic value cannot be confined in one, unique and exhaustive definition. The cases being too various, it is more useful defining a number of parameters that Judges can apply on a case-by-case basis, considering in depth the concrete facts occurred. Those parameters, continues the Court, have both subjective and objective aspects.

As to the former, they consist in the capability of the object to stir aesthetic emotions, in the greater creativity or originality of the shape – compared the others normally found in similar products on the market – transcending the practical functionality of the good: aesthetic have its own independent and distinct relevance. These emotions, admits the Supreme Court, are inevitably subject to the personal experience, culture, feeling and taste of the individual doing the evaluation. The result of the assessment on the existence of artistic value may thus change depending on who looks at the piece of design. So, it is necessary to indicate more objective parameters.

It is therefore to be considered the recognition that the piece of design has received within the cultural and institutional circles with respect to its artistic and aesthetic features. This witnesses that the aesthetic appearance is considered capable of giving to the object a value and a meaning independent from its strict functionality. In concrete, this is shown by the presence of the object at museum or exhibitions, mentions in specialized newspapers and journals (not having a commercial scope), the critics, awards, prices and similar. On top of that, crucial appears the circumstance that the object has gained an autonomous value on the market of pieces of art, parallel to the commercial one or, more commonly, that it has reached a high economic value showing that the public appreciates and recognizes (and is ready to pay) its artistic merits. All the above elements are inevitably influenced by time: if a product is new it would have had no time to receive such prices, honors and awards from third parties. Even this parameter shall thus not be considered as absolute, but still connected to a case by case analysis.

With the above, wide and flexible interpretation of the concept of artistic value, the Supreme Court appears to distance itself from a jurisprudence that focused the existence of  even just one of the above circumstances.  In particular, it seems to downplay the current trend, more and more popular in the merit Courts,  whereby the presence of the piece of design in museums and exhibitions constitutes per se a sufficient evidence of the artistic merits of an object. The decision in comment seems to ask the lower Courts to be more selective and in ascertaining the existence of an artistic merit in the design object. And to do this on a case-by-case analysis, excluding any “a priori” single-criterion-based assessment.

By this decision the Supreme Court gives objectively rules in favor of small or new designers and firms, whose products could achieve protection on the basis of a concrete analysis of the single object’s potentialities, independently from its long-lasting presence on the market, huge marketing efforts, or the capability to  exhibit  the object in a museum. The current approach, criticized by the Supreme Court, seems indeed to privilege ( moreover, in an era of crisis) companies that are already solidly established and powerful on the market. This decision is good news for competition.

Maria Luigia Franceschelli

Italian Supreme Court, case No. 23292/2015, 13 November 2015, Metalco S.p.A. vs City Design S.r.l. and City Design S.p.A..

Italian Courts and the protection of Graphical User Interfaces under copyright laws: some recent cases

In some recent cases (case “Trend for Trend Vs Pix Agency” dated 5.2.2016; case “DriveK Italia Vs Webbdone” dated 20.3.2016 and case “Esko Software Vs Beegraphic” dated 6.7.2012) the Court of Milan has ruled with regard to the legal protection of the Graphical User Interfaces (“GUI”) and more in detail on the protection of the overall aspect of the GUI (the so called “Look&Feel”). The GUI can be considered as an atypical and complex creative work based on a project that combines graphical and navigation elements allowing interaction between users and devices (both at software and hardware level).

The term “Look&Feel” is sometimes used in EU case law (AG Bot – C 309/09) and by Italian scholars (Giordano D., Software e grafica dei social network, AIDA 2011, 248) as a synonymous of GUI (see AG’s Conclusion – C 309/09: “The graphic user interface, commonly referred to as the ‘look and feel’, enables communication between the program and the user”). More precisely, some scholars (Hayes, What’s left of “look and feel”: a current analysis, in Comp. Lawyer, X 1993, n. 5) consider “Look” the combination of all the visual and/or audio elements of a computer program as presented in a GUI and “Feel” as the sequence, structure and organization of the non-literal elements into a GUI. It has been questioned whether the overall “look and feel” (i.e. the combination of visual elements and the organization of such elements for interaction with users) can be protected as a whole.

The overall “Look&Feel” and the individual elements in a GUI can be protected, under certain conditions (notably with an adequate level of creativity), by Italian copyright law (see Article 1.1 and Article 19 Italian Copyright Law). This conclusion should not be disputed in case of one-to-one copies of GUIs and/or individual elements in a GUI (i.e. in case of “literal copyright infringements”). More problematic is the case of non-literal copyright infringement of the overall “look and feel”, where it has to be clarified which elements in the overall “look and feel” are eligible for copyright protection.

An obstacle to the protection of the “Look&Feel” is represented by Article 1.2 Software Directive (2009/24/EC), according to which ideas and principles of a computer programs are not eligible for protection under copyright law (“Protection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a computer program. Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive”). Such EU provision is implemented by Article 2 n.8 Italian Copyright Law. It could be argued that “Look&Feel” incorporates some basic ideas and principles of the computer program generating the GUI. According to the above, protection under Italian copyright law could be granted to the overall “Look&Feel ” without taking into consideration those elements in the GUI: (i) that are expression of technical ideas and principles at the basis of the computer program generating the GUI; and (ii) that are the necessary result of the functional organization of the GUI.

On the other hand, the “Look&Feel” of a GUI could imply a level of creativity in the sequence, structure and organization of the elements, eligible for copyright protection as “elaborated ideas”. A possibile confirmation of this type of protection can be found in a EU case related to the protection of a computer manual. The CJEU has stated that, with reference to a computer manual, also the choice, sequence and combinations of commands, options, defaults and iterations is expression of creativity and can result in an intellectual creation protected under copyright law (see CJEU case C-406/10 “[…] the keywords, syntax, commands and combinations of commands, options, defaults and iterations consist of words, figures or mathematical concepts which, considered in isolation, are not, as such, an intellectual creation of the author of the computer program. It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words, figures or mathematical concepts that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result, namely the user manual for the computer program, which is an intellectual creation”).

Italian case law regarding the alleged copyright infringement of the GUI of a website has usually excluded the violation of copyright laws in case of non-literal infringement and has made in some cases application of the rules against unfair competition practice in the Italian Civil Code (namely article 2598 ICC). Nevertheless in their legal analysis the Courts have expressed their view on the protection of GUIs under copyright laws. The Court of Milan in the case Trend for Trend Vs Pix Agency dated 5.2.2016, regarding the alleged copyright infringement of the GUI of a website, held that the scope of copyright protection includes both the expression and the elaboration of ideas but found that the format of the allegedly infringed website (inclusive of a description of the GUI) filed with the SIAE was not eligible for protection and that a comparison of the GUI (without taking into consideration forms imposed by the technical nature of the services proposed by the websites) excluded any graphical coherence between the GUIs. In another case the Court of Milan dated 20.3.2016 (DriveK Italia Vs Webbdone), excluding copyright infringement of the GUI of a computer program, stated that it is on the claimant to prove the level of creativity of the GUI, also by offering a reconstruction of the state of the art in the sector of the software at stake and/or by offering a comparison with other comparable software. Finally, in a case before the Court of Milan dated 6.7.2012 (Esko Software Vs Beegraphic) the technical expert found that most of the elements of the GUIs under comparison were imposed by technical reasons and that the organization of the elements in the GUI of the defendant was sufficiently differentiated by the same elements in the GUI of the claimant.

Gianluca Campus

The partial remedies introduced by the EU Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market of 14 September 2016

InfoSoc’s unbalanced approach has been only partially – very partially – remedied by the Proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market of 14 September 2016 (here). Let us go through its main tenets.

  1. New mandatory exceptions

The Proposal envisages the extension of the range of mandatory exceptions to:

  1. “reproductions and extractions made by research organizations in order to carry out text and data mining…for the purpose of scientific research” (Art. 3);
  2. “the digital use of works…for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching, to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose…” (Art. 4, dictating further restrictive conditions for the enjoyment of the exception; emphasis added);
  3. making copies, by cultural heritage institutions, of works permanently in their collections, for the sole purpose of preservation of such works (Art. 5).

These extensions deserve approval, of course, as they ‘upgrade’ to mandatory exceptions that InfoSoc provides as discretionary (Art. 5,2.c, e, and 3,a). But their impact is weakened by their persistent subjection – as all other exceptions and limitations foreseen by InfoSoc – to the barrier of the (in)famous three-step test which allows the copyright holder to oppose in judiciary sitting the actual enjoyment of the exceptions. Moreover, they are equally subject to the criterion of ‘strict interpretation’, also dictated by InfoSoc (confirmed by Art. 6 of the Proposal). Thus, for example, the ‘new’ exceptions under a), b) and c) would not allow either the market exploitation by research organizations of the fruits (reports) of their work, or the chance of Universities and other teaching institutions to edit and publish texts assembling lessons and other fruits of their educational activities.

Now, in all the cases where the public interest to spread culture and information may marry with economic exploitation (at times, however, non lucrative in proper sense: cultural heritage institutions, for instance, are bound to invest their incomes in institutional activities), wouldn’t be wiser – and truly consistent with the proclaimed aim to enhance the diffusion of culture and information – to adopt a mechanism of open paying access, instead than across-the board holding fast to the excludent paradigm?

The Max Planck Institute (MPI) went further and affirmed that data mining exception should apply also to commercial uses “as far as concerns content to which the persons performing the mining have lawful access” (see MPI position paper available here). Data mining relates to new analysis techniques to process large amounts of data, particularly to identify correlations and trends, which can be helpful in different sectors (health, marketing, IoT, etc.). In this regards, as acknowledged by Recital 8 “text and data mining may involve acts protected by copyright and/or by the sui generis database right, notably the reproduction of works or other subject-matter and/or the extraction of contents from a database”. Therefore, a general data mining exception would limit copyright and database rights. In this regard, the MPI says instead that data mining should be regarded as a normal use of a work, not requiring further authorization once a lawful access to the work is obtained. On the contrary, the new exception should be extended to cover data mining for research purposes even in cases of unauthorized access to protected works, i.e. research organizations should be able to carry out data mining without having to acquire access to the protected works.

We agree on that view. We however add that, in light of the concurring collective interests, data mining for commercial purposes should not in any case be subject to exclusive rights but rather to a regime of open paying access: business entities should be able to carry out data mining without having to acquire a general access to the protected works but rather by paying a reasonable fee/compensation.

  1. Use of out-of-commerce works by cultural heritage institutions

The Proposal provides for non-exclusive licences stipulated by collective management organizations with cultural heritage institutions for the digitisation, distribution communication and making available to the public of out-of-commerce works whose copyright belongs also to right holders not represented by the collective management organization – and this with cross-border effect (Arts 7-8).

The mechanism that empowers cultural institutions to (store and also) publish works ‘out-of-commerce’ is quite precarious, as the rightholders “may at any time object to their works…be deemed to be out of commerce and exclude the application of the licence to their works” (Art. 7,1.c). And this, without any obligation to resume the publication of the ‘forgotten’ works. As matter of fact, in its weakness, the new regime apparently amounts to a tentative compromise solution with the principle, recently re-stated by the CJEU in interpreting InfoSoc, whereby collecting societies cannot by their own initiative (i.e. substituting themselves to authors) authorize cultural institutions to digitise, store, communicate and make available to the public out-of-commerce works (CJEU, 11 November 2016, case C-301/15, Soulier and Doke).

  1. New rights on press publications against digital uses

The Proposal introduces (Art. 11) a new right, lasting 20 years, in favour of newspapers and magazines publishers to bar third parties (except the authors of the articles) from unauthorized extraction and online exploitation of even short, even very short (‘snippets’), parts of published articles.

This provision represents a ‘hardened’ version of the German Copyright Law which – possibly on the blueprint of an ancient jurisprudence of French origin – instead condoned the extraction and use of ‘imperceptible thefts’ (‘larcins imperceptibles’).

This right is commonly labelled “ancillary”: in truth it is a straight copyright (albeit with a reduced term) since it simply confirms the faculty of copyright holders’ (newspapers and magazine publishers) to grant or deny the authorization to exploit derivative works. Excerpts are indeed ‘reductions’, typically derivative works (hence included in the provision of Art. 12 of Berne Convention): works ultimately similar to the ‘condensed (sic.) books’ traditionally published by the American magazine Reader’s Digest. And the extreme brevity of the extracted text does not per se deny – particularly considering the typical ultra-synthetic mode of today’s digital communications – that the ‘snippet’ can well feature an ‘informational product’ as such apt to be sold and/or draw advertising revenues. Thus subtracted to the publishers of the original article.

However, the basic weakness of the new provision consists, again, in shaping a straight excluding right (just grazed by the research/teaching exception), i.e. remaining stuck to a proprietary approach to facts-assembling (are we introducing copyright on information and facts?). Which (contrast with Feist’s liberal inspiration aside) represents an objective factor of slowdown of the circulation of culture and information.

Once again, wouldn’t it have been wiser to adopt an ‘open paying access’ scheme in dealing with (derivative) commercial journalistic uses of copyrighted materials? For example by sharing part of the actual incomes generated by the derivative uses, if any.

In sum, the trumpet-announced ‘new copyright for the digital age’ is still fundamentally the old closed monad, just renovated with a few narrow windows. This indeed seems the solution adopted also for User Generated Contents (“UGCs”).

  1. Mandatory cooperation between ISPs and copyright holders on UGCs

The Proposal (Art. 13) tries to regulate UGC platforms. It imposes ISPs to “take measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their works or other subject-matter or to prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the service providers”.

As regard the imposition of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their works the Proposal is justified as it compensate copyright holders by placing on ISPs the burden of the unauthorised use of protected works on UGC platforms (which ISPs monetize), possibly by sharing part of advertising revenues.

However, the Proposal raises some concerns as it seems – again – dictated exclusively by the tentative of expanding the copyright scope. First, it is not coordinated with E-Commerce Directive and its safe harbour provisions: who are the ISPs concerned? What about “passive” ISPs and the ban of monitoring obligations on the net? In fact, a general obligation to prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the service providers should be imposed exclusively on “active” providers and should be carefully intended as a exception of the net neutrality principle.

Second, albeit the copyright scope is extended over the e-commerce safe harbours, there is no attempt to expand and adapt the existing framework of copyright exceptions to the online environment. And this despite the fragmented and restrictive implementation of InfoSoc’s exceptions list. This is particularly the case of those exceptions that could better fit online uses, i.e., quotation right (Infosoc Art. 5,3.d), parody (Art. 5,3.k) and incidental inclusion of works in other materials (Art. 5,3.i). In most cases restrictively transposed into national laws (where implemented). In other words, the formalized obligation to monitor UGC platforms is not balanced by any legal tools to safeguard new fair uses deserving areas of freedom. Additionally, online monitoring programs used by copyright holders – that would in fact be supported by the Proposal – can difficulty distinguish “fair” uses. Thus, it should have been advisable at least imposing to Member States to fully transpose all InfoSoc exceptions without reducing their scope. With no need to recall what already observed about the three-step test and the need of adapting it as a balancing criterion rather than an exclusive restrictive mechanism.

  1. Fair remuneration in contracts of authors and performers

An innovation that deserves full approval is instead the modified regime of contractual relations authors-publishers that allows the former to request not only an improvement of the level of royalties previously agreed upon, but also (read Art. 14.1 and 2, in functional connection with Art. 15), a fair share of the revenues from the ‘other’ sources of income, i.e. advertising, commercial offers, public representations, etc. In case of disagreement, the dispute author/publisher might be entrusted to ADR (Art. 16).

Realistically, though, the chances to achieve such revisions will depend on general agreements stipulated by collecting societies and publishers’ associations – ultimately, by said societies and the major ‘platforms’.

However, this provision is of high systemic relevance, as it allows alterations of the contractually agreed balance of the parties’ interests beyond the classical boundary of exceptional/unforeseeable new supervening circumstances of dramatic economic impact. And, above all, it fills a manifest lacuna of the InfoSoc Directive, which, as hinted above, is missed: the chance of a regulatory support of new ‘business models’ of dissemination of the works associated with the advent of the Internet and digital technology. Models often characterized by no payment obligation for the user for the enjoyment of single works disseminated online, and where the commercial revenues stem in whole or in part from advertising and the sale of various services and other similar sources. Hence, InfoSoc failed also to defend the legitimate rights of authors to obtain their slice of the pie of these other commercial revenues however stemming from the exploitation, direct or indirect, of their works – especially vis-à-vis ‘free’ online distribution models.