Punitive damages for IP infringement and the Enforcement Directive: some thoughts on the OTK decision

On 25 January last, just a few months after the Liffers (here, and on IPlens) and Hansson (here) judgments, the EU Court of Justice issued another decision under Article 267 TFEU on compensation for IP infringement (OTK, C-367/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:36: here).

The case concerned the compatibility with Article 13 of Directive 2004/48 (the Enforcement Directive) of a provision of the Polish copyright law whereby, in the case of infringement, the copyright holder may be awarded a sum of money consisting of two or three times the amount of the hypothetical royalty.

Pending the referral proceedings, the above national provision was declared unconstitutional by the Trybunał Konstytucyjny (the Polish Constitutional Court) insofar as it provided for compensation amounting to “three times” the hypothetical royalty. As a consequence, the scope of the EUCJ’s analysis was narrowed to “duplication” of the hypothetical royalty.

However, while triplication of the hypothetical royalty (at least in many cases) quite blatantly amounts to a punishment, duplication thereof may also be viewed as a way of ensuring that IP holders are fully compensated for the damage they have suffered. Therefore, the decision of the Polish Constitutional Court gave the EUCJ the opportunity to answer the preliminary question posed by the referring Court without explicitly ruling on the compatibility of punitive damages with the Enforcement Directive. An opportunity which – at least at first sight – the EUCJ did not miss.

After stating that

Directive 2004/48 lays down a minimum standard concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights and does not prevent the Member States from laying down measures that are more protective” (paragraph 23)

and that

the fact that Directive 2004/48 does not entail an obligation on the Member States to provide for ‘punitive’ damages cannot be interpreted as a prohibition on introducing such a measure” (paragraph 28)

the Court went on to state that

without there being any need to rule on whether or not the introduction of ‘punitive’ damages would be contrary to Article 13 of Directive 2004/48, it is not evident that the provision applicable in the main proceedings entails an obligation to pay such damages” (paragraph 29), in view of the circumstance that “mere payment of the hypothetical royalty is not capable of guaranteeing compensation in respect of all the loss actually suffered, given that payment of that royalty would not, in itself, ensure reimbursement of any costs — referred to in recital 26 of Directive 2004/48 — that are linked to researching and identifying possible acts of infringement, compensation for possible moral prejudice … or payment of interest on the sums due” (paragraph 30).

In the light of the above, it would be fair to think that the Court did not believe the issue of punitive damages to be at stake in the case at hand; that, in the Court’s view, the Polish provision in question did not provide for punitive damages; and that, therefore, the Court saw no reasons for (again, explicitly) ruling on the compatibility of such damages with Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive.

However, in paragraph 31, the Court concludes its reasoning by admitting that a doubled “hypothetical royalty” may exceed the loss actually suffered by the IP holder: and, “in exceptional cases, may exceed it “so clearly and substantially that a claim to that effect could constitute an abuse of rights, prohibited by Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48”.

So, quite interestingly, when it deals with the case of the IP holder being awarded a sum exceeding the actual loss as a result of the application of the Polish provision at stake, the Court does not make any reference to Article 13 and to the expression “damages appropriate to the actual prejudice” contained therein. In line with its conception of the Directive as a “minimum standard” (paragraph 23), the Court only relies, with regard to damages exceeding the actual loss, on the concept of abuse of right provided by Article 3(2). And this seems to be an implicit acknowledgment of the admissibility of punitive damages under Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive. Indeed, on the one hand, damages which exceed (even if not “clearly” and “substantially”) the actual loss suffered by the IP holder are not compensatory, but punitive. On the other hand, an abuse of right entails the existence of a right. Thus, it might be inferred from paragraph 31 of the reasoning that, according to the Court, the Directive does not prevent national laws from providing IP holders with the right to be awarded damages which exceed the actual loss they suffered – that is, punitive damages. However, the right in question, just like any other, should not be abused. And, in this regard, the Court appears to find in the general Member States’ obligation to provide for safeguards against the abuse of rights under Article 3(2) of the Directive the sole limit to punitive damages laid down by the Directive itself. The Court does not precisely indicate when claiming damages which exceed the actual loss constitutes an abuse of right. It simply says that claiming damages which clearly and substantially exceed the actual loss may amount to an abuse, thus leaving unsolved the issue of what “clearly” and “substantially” mean.

The Court decision, in this perspective, appears to be in flagrant contrast with the opinion (here) of Advocate General Sharpston (who pointed out that, under the Enforcement Directive, compensation should be appropriate and proportionate to the actual prejudice suffered by the IP holder).

It may be noticed that a provision almost identical to the Polish one was contained in the Proposal for a Directive on measures and procedures to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights presented by the Commission on January 2003 (here). Under Article 17 of the Proposal [which, contrary to Article 13 and recital 26 of the Enforcement Directive, expressly referred to both compensatory and non-compensatory damages]:

“… the competent authorities shall award, at the request of the prejudiced party:

(a)  … damages set at double the royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual property right in question.

And, in such respect, the Commission’s Executive Memorandum (here) read as follows:

This provision does not constitute punitive damages; rather, it allows for compensation based on an objective criterion while taking account of the expense incurred by the right holder such as administrative expenses incurred in identifying the infringement and researching its origin”.

*** . *** . ***

The issue of punitive damages is a very hot one. In Italy, such damages have traditionally been considered as contrary to the public order (see, for all, Court of Cassation, 19 January 2007, no. 1183). However, quite recently [1], the I Civil Division of the Italian Court of Cassation submitted the issue to the President of the Court of Cassation for the possible consideration of the Joint Divisions of the same Court of Cassation, also in view of the presence in the Italian legal system of provisions which may be read as providing for punitive damages. So far, no decision has been rendered by the Court of Cassation in this respect. However, it is not unlikely that the Court will change its traditional stance.

In this context, it is worth remembering that Article 68(2) of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court clearly provides that “The infringer shall not benefit from the infringement. However, damages shall not be punitive”. Thus, at least in (unitary) patent matters, the issue might be considered to be resolved.

Riccardo Perotti

[1] Order no. 9978 of 16 May 2016, available here.

EU Court of Justice, 25 January 2017, Stowarzyszenie ‘Oławska Telewizja Kablowa’ v Stowarzyszenie Filmowców PolskichC-367/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:36.

The Court of Rome reintroduces the notion of “active hosting provider”: new uncertainties on the ISP liability rules

By a decision published on 27 April 2016, the Court of Rome held TMFT Enterprises LLC- Break Media (“Break Media“) liable for copyright infringement for the unauthorized streaming of audiovisual content owned by Reti Televisive Italiane S.p.A. (“RTI“).

Break Media argued that it was a passive hosting provider because it merely stored information at the request of a recipient of its service. Pursuant to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/CE, as implemented in Italy by Legislative Decree 70/2003, hosting providers are not liable for stored information if they are unaware of its illegal nature. Moreover they are not required to remove illegal content unless ordered to do so by the competent public authorities.

Further, the provider outlined that the notice sent by RTI was generic, failing to report the location (URL) where the infringing content were placed. Therefore, it imposed no legal obligation to inform the competent authorities under Article 17 of the Directive and no liability for contributory copyright infringement could be found.

In addressing the hosting provider’s arguments, the Court of Rome found the website owner to be liable.

In line with the previous Italian case law (cf. Court of Rome, October 20 2011, VVBcom.Limited and Choopa LLC; Court of Milan May 19 2011, RTI v Yahoo! Italia and Court of Milano, January 20 2011, RTI v ItaliaOnline Srl) the Court of Rome applied the distinction between active and passive hosting providers, based on the analysis of the activities performed by the entity in question.

The decision held that if a hosting provider is directly involved in the website’s operations by allowing users to upload videos and other content, it is deemed to manage the information and content that its users provide. In this case, the ISP would be regarded as an active hosting provider, subject to a duty to remove illicit content if so requested by the rights’ holder.

On the contrary, if a hosting provider merely provides storage and connectivity to specific websites, and plays no active role in managing information online, it should be regarded as a passive hosting provider, which is not jointly liable with website owner for copyright infringement unless it fails to comply with a removal order issued by the competent administrative or judicial authorities or is aware of the illicit nature of the content on the hosted website and fail to alert the competent authorities.

According to the Court, Break Media was an “active hosting” of media content. Indeed, the activity of Break Media was not limited to the activation of technical procedures for enabling the content to be loaded to the platform (“passive hosting”), but provided a complex service of advertising exploitation of the content.

As a result, the liability exemptions established by Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive were not applicable.

Although RTI’s notice demanding the removal of the infringing materials from the platform did not identify the specific location of the content to be removed, the defendant was effectively aware of the infringing nature of the content. This knolwedge was deemed enough in order to affirm the provider’s liability.

Based on the above, the Court condemned the provider to pay damages for € 115,000, approximately corresponding to € 1.300 for each minute of unauthorized publication.

Reintroducing principles affirmed by the aforementioned case law, the current decision distanced from the decision of the European Court of Justice on the SABAM case (24 November 2011 in Case C‑70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM et al.) according to which national authorities are prohibited from adopting measures which would require an ISP to carry out general monitoring of the information that it transmits on its network.

Based on the SABAM jurisprudence, the Court of Appeal of Milan, January 7 2015, overturning the Court of Milan first instance decision in the case RTI v. Yahoo! Italia, took the view that the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ hosting providers should be regarded as misleading, being envisaged in neither the E-Commerce Directive nor in the Italian implementing Legislative Decree 70/2003. Consequently the fact that an ISP provides for services to organize contents published by its users should not change its role.

The issue provides matter of clarification for the Supreme Court.

For further comments look at the interesting analysis carried out by Maria Letizia Bixio on dimt.it

Jacopo Ciani

Court of Rome, 27 April 2016, Reti Televisive Italiane S.p.A. v. TMFT Enterprises LLC- Break Media

Max Mara gets patent protection for jeans’ pockets which fit better to wearers’ body shapes.

By judgment no. 472 of 14 January 2016, the IP Court of Milan (Judges Mr Marangoni, Mrs Dal Moro and Mrs Giani) ruled that jeans produced by Germani Group and distributed by Il Passatempo infringed Max Mara’s italian patent on “a pocket for clothing” that can “enhance and shape the forms of the wearers, with particular reference to the gluteus area”.

The Court dismissed the defendants’ exception of patent invalidity, based on the alleged lack of inventive step. A three-dimensional pocket that well adapts to the body constitutes an appropriate technical solution for a very clear technical problem: the reduction of the jeans unpleasant aesthetic effect of flattening and the increase in comfort. “This technical solution involves an inventive step, since for a person in the art it was not evident from the state of the art.

The Court recognized that the patent infringement amounted also to unfair competition for contrast with professional ethics principles under art. 2598 no. 3) Italian Civil Code.

With reference to the distributor, the Court excluded its exemption from liability because unaware of the infringing nature of the saled product. Since intellectual property rights are subject to a system of publicity, the Court argued that market operators are presumed to be aware of their existence. As a consequence, the sale of i
nfringing goods amounts to infringement unless the distributor gives evidence that he was unaware, without his fault, of the infringement. That was not the case, since the distributor continued in marketing the infringing product even after the date of notification of the summons.

As regards the assessment of damages, the Court ordered the defendants to return the profits derived from the sale of the infringing products pursuant to art. 125 Italian Code of Industrial Property. This remedy was granted notwithstanding that Max Mara had not provided any evidence of the alleged damages and loss of profits. Even if the infringement does not give rise to damages, in any case it cannot enrich its authors, which will have to return their profits.

The decision seems to set the inventive step’s threshold required to get patent protection at a particularly low level. The related risk is that the same owner could claim different protections in relation to the same products. Indeed, in connection with the same jeans, design or even trademark protection could be successfully invoked as well.

Court of Milan, 14 January 2016, n. 472, Max Mara v. Germani Group et al. 

 

Jacopo Ciani